From 584936eb09cef64eb0755c0ccb2661e7ba1aea58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hubert Kario Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 19:16:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] rsa: Add option to disable implicit rejection CVE: CVE-2023-50781 Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/5ab3ec1bb1eaa795d775f5896818cfaa84d33a1a] Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817) Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song --- crypto/cms/cms_env.c | 7 +++++ crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c | 6 +++++ crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c | 16 ++++++++---- crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c | 20 +++++++++++++- doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in | 10 +++++++ doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod | 2 ++ doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod | 9 +++++++ include/openssl/core_names.h | 2 ++ include/openssl/rsa.h | 5 ++++ .../implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++-- 10 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c index 2326253..96e3315 100644 --- a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c +++ b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c @@ -576,6 +576,13 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, if (!ossl_cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1)) goto err; + if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) + /* upper layer CMS code incorrectly assumes that a successful RSA + * decryption means that the key matches ciphertext (which never + * was the case, implicit rejection or not), so to make it work + * disable implicit rejection for RSA keys */ + EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ktri->pctx, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", "0"); + if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, NULL, &eklen, ktri->encryptedKey->data, ktri->encryptedKey->length) diff --git a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c index 14306a0..b481776 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c +++ b/crypto/evp/ctrl_params_translate.c @@ -2249,6 +2249,12 @@ static const struct translation_st evp_pkey_ctx_translations[] = { EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, NULL, NULL, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR, NULL }, + { SET, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL, + "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", + OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER, + NULL }, + { SET, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, 0, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_GEN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, "rsa_pss_keygen_md", NULL, OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING, fix_md }, diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c index d658a3c..5a0b160 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c @@ -391,6 +391,12 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; + /* + * we need the value of the private exponent to perform implicit rejection + */ + if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) && (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) + padding = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING; + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx)) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); @@ -481,7 +487,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, * derive the Key Derivation Key from private exponent and public * ciphertext */ - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)) { + if (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { /* * because we use d as a handle to rsa->d we need to keep it local and * free before any further use of rsa->d @@ -557,11 +563,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, goto err; switch (padding) { + case RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING: + r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); + break; case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: - if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) - r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); - else - r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(rsa->libctx, to, num, buf, j, num, kdk); + r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(rsa->libctx, to, num, buf, j, num, kdk); break; case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c index 85cdfb4..7f3d810 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c @@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ typedef struct { /* OAEP label */ unsigned char *oaep_label; size_t oaep_labellen; + /* if to use implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption */ + int implicit_rejection; } RSA_PKEY_CTX; /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */ @@ -72,6 +74,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */ rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; rctx->min_saltlen = -1; + rctx->implicit_rejection = 1; ctx->data = rctx; ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp; ctx->keygen_info_count = 2; @@ -97,6 +100,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) dctx->md = sctx->md; dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md; dctx->saltlen = sctx->saltlen; + dctx->implicit_rejection = sctx->implicit_rejection; if (sctx->oaep_label) { OPENSSL_free(dctx->oaep_label); dctx->oaep_label = OPENSSL_memdup(sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen); @@ -345,6 +349,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) { int ret; + int pad_mode; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; /* * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of @@ -365,7 +370,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md); } else { - ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); + if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING && + rctx->implicit_rejection == 0) + pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING; + else + pad_mode = rctx->pad_mode; + ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, pad_mode); } *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret); ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1); @@ -587,6 +597,14 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label; return rctx->oaep_labellen; + case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION: + if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); + return -2; + } + rctx->implicit_rejection = p1; + return 1; + case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in index 015265a..5e62551 100644 --- a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in +++ b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in @@ -305,6 +305,16 @@ explicitly set in PSS mode then the signing digest is used. Sets the digest used for the OAEP hash function. If not explicitly set then SHA1 is used. +=item BI + +Disables (when set to 0) or enables (when set to 1) the use of implicit +rejection with PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. When enabled (the default), as a +protection against Bleichenbacher attack, the library will generate a +deterministic random plaintext that it will return to the caller in case +of padding check failure. +When disabled, it's the callers' responsibility to handle the returned +errors in a side-channel free manner. + =back =head1 RSA-PSS ALGORITHM diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod index e788f38..3844aa2 100644 --- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod +++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod @@ -392,6 +392,8 @@ instead of padding errors in case padding checks fail. Applications that want to remain secure while using earlier versions of OpenSSL, still need to handle both the error code from the RSA decryption operation and the returned message in a side channel secure manner. +This protection against Bleichenbacher attacks can be disabled by setting +the OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (an unsigned integer) to 0. =head2 DSA parameters diff --git a/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod b/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod index 0976a26..2a8426a 100644 --- a/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod +++ b/doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod @@ -234,6 +234,15 @@ The TLS protocol version first requested by the client. The negotiated TLS protocol version. +=item "implicit-rejection" (B) + +Gets of sets the use of the implicit rejection mechanism for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 +decryption. When set (non zero value), the decryption API will return +a deterministically random value if the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding check fails. +This makes explotation of the Bleichenbacher significantly harder, even +if the code using the RSA decryption API is not implemented in side-channel +free manner. Set by default. + =back OSSL_FUNC_asym_cipher_gettable_ctx_params() and OSSL_FUNC_asym_cipher_settable_ctx_params() diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h index 02bebc6..9586a6d 100644 --- a/include/openssl/core_names.h +++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h @@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ extern "C" { #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIST_ID "distid" #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY "pub" #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY "priv" +#define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION "implicit-rejection" /* Diffie-Hellman/DSA Parameters */ #define OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P "p" @@ -467,6 +468,7 @@ extern "C" { #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL "oaep-label" #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION "tls-client-version" #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION "tls-negotiated-version" +#define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION "implicit-rejection" /* * Encoder / decoder parameters diff --git a/include/openssl/rsa.h b/include/openssl/rsa.h index 36a780d..ceb05b2 100644 --- a/include/openssl/rsa.h +++ b/include/openssl/rsa.h @@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label); #define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13) +#define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_IMPLICIT_REJECTION (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 14) + #define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1 #define RSA_NO_PADDING 3 #define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 4 @@ -192,6 +194,9 @@ int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label); #define RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING 6 #define RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING 7 +/* internal RSA_ only */ +#define RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING 8 + #define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE 11 #define RSA_set_app_data(s, arg) RSA_set_ex_data(s, 0, arg) diff --git a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c index 799357f3..1e74150 100644 --- a/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c +++ b/providers/implementations/asymciphers/rsa_enc.c @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ typedef struct { /* TLS padding */ unsigned int client_version; unsigned int alt_version; + /* PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption mode */ + unsigned int implicit_rejection; } PROV_RSA_CTX; static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx) @@ -107,6 +109,7 @@ static int rsa_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], RSA_free(prsactx->rsa); prsactx->rsa = vrsa; prsactx->operation = operation; + prsactx->implicit_rejection = 1; switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) { case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA: @@ -203,6 +206,7 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, { PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx; int ret; + int pad_mode; size_t len = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa); if (!ossl_prov_is_running()) @@ -280,8 +284,12 @@ static int rsa_decrypt(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, } OPENSSL_free(tbuf); } else { - ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, prsactx->rsa, - prsactx->pad_mode); + if ((prsactx->implicit_rejection == 0) && + (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) + pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_NO_IMPLICIT_REJECT_PADDING; + else + pad_mode = prsactx->pad_mode; + ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, prsactx->rsa, pad_mode); } *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret); ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), 0, 1); @@ -403,6 +411,10 @@ static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params) if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->alt_version)) return 0; + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_uint(p, prsactx->implicit_rejection)) + return 0; + return 1; } @@ -414,6 +426,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { NULL, 0), OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_END }; @@ -549,6 +562,14 @@ static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) return 0; prsactx->alt_version = alt_version; } + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION); + if (p != NULL) { + unsigned int implicit_rejection; + + if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &implicit_rejection)) + return 0; + prsactx->implicit_rejection = implicit_rejection; + } return 1; } @@ -562,6 +583,7 @@ static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = { OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, NULL, 0), OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_IMPLICIT_REJECTION, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_END };